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INThODUCTION

T,he Panic of 1807, its causes, extent, results,
and the remedies taken to correct the chaotic situation form
the objectives of this investigation.

In the process of pre-

senting the relevant material in a clear and concise manner,
the writer has a five-fold pur/Jose in mind.

In the first }Jlace

a generalized picture of the back,ground previous to the October
scare is given.

Secondly, the mental set of the people directly

involved and the people affected is mirrored from primary
sources.

Thirdly, eye-witness accounts of what was seen and

what the probable effects would be are given.

Fourthly, remedi-

al measures taken to alleviate the financial and economic instability of the Panic are described.

Finally, an evaluation

of the causes and remedies and their immediate effects are set
down.

In pursuing the investigation, it became patent
that many leaders were distfessed over the instability of their
money and some seized the opportunity to profit through illegal
means.

Others were blissfully ignorant of the impending crash,

while the majority cared little or nothinF, about the situation
and continued to live as they had without regard to existing
i

"...,
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~I)W

ttions cwd their ulttE1 8.te eff'·cts.

t Lie I",'nole period

a.uilost too hum8n to eV2.1u,.':,te.

WB.S

very [f1.Jmc,ness, no','€ver, that

r}1(:,J~,::;s

0istory so vital, absorbing, and

prob~bly

will remain.

~,prio()

tis

perha~s

80 YD0 of tne

'alf l'.!el1tury rerr10ver)..
today and

It [lay be stated that

I'.!('nc

It is tllis

in our nation I s

frofttable to us a

itions are still with us

It is rn11y too true trBt little

can be done to i:Yltt a stop to c2<relessness, over-sl-,encjing, and
ill-advised investr;:ents.

A picture of past disasters will no

doubt continue to be seen by IPany unseeing eyes.
~oose W.O ~ay
,lop~'fully

Thus, it is to

profit from past rnistak,::;s t2t this paper is

ciedicated

numan al'.!tion for its

a~;

".'eLL as to tnose

OTl.'TI

merit.

W,O

are interested in

GEAP'I'EH I
lhHTED 8T J\.'L~8

tIur~Rn nature t8 Sll'? n tflat
not ~n~ save tndustrial ~xveri~
encs of the sort mill convince
tJ~e avera';e man that a limit is
set by financial la~r.T to t .,le use
of credit in r3iid indu3trial
expansion, and that the llrJ1it
will usually l~ve been very
nearly r,..,ac [Led when business proslJerity seems to have re;',c ~'e(l its
!'.1ost eXi'tlted ;-;eig ,It s. 'F:ac n successive business ~eneration, tnsrefore, lJu.rsues :LtS way in citeerfl..J.l
el"" fiance of the tea{~ d Tj/'. s of t i.le
p,~st; eacn blows its O'ern ftncmf!i.al
8.nd industrial bubble; e~':'i, nfter
two or thrr-e dis;C:;Rrded warnin:cs,
f.lbS to face t e terrifif! l!f:'nalty;
and, having passf:'d throug n tos.t
experience, eElch r:lay be deppnded
on for conservatism un.til toe next
generation of eXl:,loitine: finC'iTlciers
CODes on the scene. 1

It is, th8refore, uncier'3t'?nciable t ne.t t (:e six
depressions in the United States fro'."'1 1830 to 1887 ".T8rC' tHe
2

result of internal

ind1J):~trial

cono i-r.; ions •

t1

It vmula be

c1 ifficult to nEi.me any ldnd of occurrenC8 or conr:i t ion 1\Thic.n
1 Alexander D.l~oyes, liThe Cycle of Prosperity,
azine, 75: 632, November 1907 to Al_Til 1908

2 Appendix A shm"ls the effects of th8se
alconolic consuL1ption in the country
1

II

Century .lJag-

de:~:ressions U,

on t t-::e

2

affects business, that did not take place during that }Jeriod."
Beginning with 1887 five more depressions descended upon the
financial world.

One was caused by the jJanic of 1880; another

was brought about by a vanic three years later; tne financial
derangement of April, 1894 was another; the Venezuela Proclamation of December, 1885 provoked the fourth; and finally the
threatened abolition of t~e gold standard in JulY, 18~6, brought
4

about the fifth.

It would be misleaaing to neglect mentioning that
these years (1833-1897) were not necessarily Imv financial ones
for the majority.

It is this writer's intention to touch the

high spots occasionally in order to show a clearer understanding
of the background of the Panic of 1907.

It must be understood,

however, that many successfully withstood the crushing effects
of such tragic happenings; but the great majority of the people
were victims of the financial strain each time it occurred.

In order to clarify tne situation, it is necessary
to obtain a clear-cut understanding of the terms "-[.Janicl! and

3 George H. Hull, .Industrial De1lressions, Frederick A. Stokes
Co., New York, 1911, 158
4 Ibid., 163

~

Itdepression rt •

As Juglar indicates:
A ••• panic may be defined as
a stoppage on t he rise of prices:
• •• t he period VI! nen ne'',f buyers
are not to be found. • ••• A
panic mej be b~oadly stated as
due to overtrading, which causes
general business to need more
than available capital, thus producing general lack of credit. 5

On the other hand, the term "depression" may be defined as " •••
a prolonged period of financial and comrnercial stagnation characterized by unemployment, restricted cr8Ciit, low prices, and
6

general social distress."

It must be Ul1derstood that not all

depreSSions involve panics; yet, panics invariably bring about
immediate depressions.

Sometimes der,pessions occur 1Nithout the

chaos engendered by a panic.

Such are due to the bad internal

structure of industry itself.

Hence, these are;uite indepen-

7

dent of panic.

Financial circles are almost immediately paralysed
by a panic, even though it be short lived, lasting only a day"
a weelc, or perhaps a few months.

The situation in a depression

5 Clement Juglar, A Brief History of Panics and Their Periodi-

£J!l Occurrence in the United StAtes, translated and edited by

De Courcy W. Thorn, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1893, 2-3
6 Franklin J. Meine, ed., Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionaa,
Columbia Educational Books, Inc., Chicago, 1940, 200
7 Hull, 18

haS a more lasting effect and does not bring about the il1!n:ea.iate

effects of a panic.

Unfortunately, it is a more durable con-

dition.
Hull gives a clear picture of toe general reaction
of t roe people to the Panic of 1907 i.i1Then he states:
The public, however, will almost inVariably identify the
panic as being responsible for
the prolonged depression,
simply because the panic, being startling and spectacular,
will make a vivid impression
upon the public mind. 8
The table below shows

ap~roximately

the lapse of

time in t ne differing ups and dO\vns in the panics and depress9

ions from 1835 to 1807:
Years of
largest
construction
1835
1847
1856
1864
1872
1881

1899

1903
1907
8 Hull, 20
9 Ib:i.d., 191

Number
of years
in the
dovm grade
7.5
4.5
5.0
5.0
6.0
15.0

1.5
1.0

-* Minor financial flurries

Number
of years
of 10\.~T
prices
3.0
2.5
2.5
2.0
2.5

3.0

1.25

2.0

Number
of years
in the
up

Special
fea~ures

~;rade

4.5

Panic in

3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0

-*

:;.5
3.25

fall~j7

Panic in 1857
Panic in fall,~
Five financial
disturbances between 1890 and
1896

*

Panic in

fall,l~

~----------------------------------~--~
5
The reasons given for the majority of these con6i tions have been blamed upon a multiplicity of factors.

l-iany

economists are not hesitant to bring forth their pet theories
regarding the causes, yet historians are united in their explanation of the effects.

This thesis is then concerned with

the 1907 upheaval and uses such crises as background material
for a clearer understanding.

Confidence in the prosperity 'Nhich began in 1897
carried

ov(~r

to succeeding years.

The expanding of many busi-

nesses necessitating corporate financing severely strained the
money market.
5, 1887, was

The cash holding of the national banks on October
ttii~2j88,900,OOO.

Hevenue exce\?ded eX:tJenditures and

the :problem of surplus financing great ly per ,:Jlexed the feaeral
10
Treasury.
Several circumstances contrtbuted to the national
prosperity.

A vast amount of grain was

gold iml-,orts were used to pay for this.

exported~

to Europe and

In the meantime, the

volurne of our own gold production had been increased.

In

l~Ol,

a partial repeal-of the taxes necessitated by the Syanish War
was welcomed by financiers no less tnan the full removal of such
taxes one year later.

Another circurnstance which helped

10 Davis R. Dewey, F:i,.!!a}!cial His.!.ory o{ ~"he Uniteg
Longmans, .Green, ann Co., New York, 1;;)34, 477

_~tC!tes,

~----------~------------------~
6
indirectly was the currency act of 1800.

This made it easier
11

and more profitable for the banks to issue notes.

Des}:;ite the obvious external
of financial storms were

se~n

in a

tighteni~g

situation in New York financial circles.
Treasury became alarned at this anci toe·k
to relieve the situation.

pros~0erity,

~iJarnings

of the money

The Secretary of the
un~~·recedented

steps

Some municipal ami state bonds were

accepted by the banks on the provision that the released
national bonds must be used as a basis for additional note circulation.

To make it even easier J the banks were permit"ced by

the Secretary to keep their federal deposits "rithout any reserve
backing.

Naturalj.y J the banks were only

too happy to cooperate

wi th the Secretary of the Treasury in these un},receriented steps.
The Clearing House Association of New York refused to make use
of this permission to accept government deposits without reserve
requirements.

By mid-summer of 1903 another scare began to rise,

further tightening the money situation as cash was needed to
move the crops.

Mr. Shaw then announced that the internal

revenue receipts already collected wouia be transferred to the
banks.
11

12

°Syst
.M. W. Sprague, History of
eII! ,
Congress,
session,

Cri_~es

61

ton, 1910, 217
12 Dewey, Fi Ilancia1

2

Hi~toa,

4:78

under the National Banking
Senate DocUIDent 538, 1Nashing-

7

Some, however, were of "C'e opinion that the SecretarY of the Treasury had no authority to make such a transfer.
T he 'Treasury Department on the other hand believed t nat the depository banks were part and parcel of toe Treasury.

Thus, it

was nothing more t .(Jan a matter of shifting money from one pocket
13
to another.

From the above, it is abundantly clear that l.lr.
Shaw was overly helpful to the New York banking circles.

The

majority of Americans were quick to realize that the Secretary
was unduly anxious on behalf of the New York bankers.

Conse-

quently, rumors began circulating to the effect that Shaw was
favoring Wall Street entirely too much to the determent of the
people at large.

Not withstanding the obvious shaky financial situation, the people were lulled into a false feeling of security.
A.s Mead tells us:
••• from 1887 to October, 1907,
tnis country enjoyed prosperity.
j\f!:oney became most abundant,
thanks to the increased national
bank-note circulation, so tl~t
the amount in the country grew
during the years ••• from twenty-

13 Dewey, Financial i::IistorY, 478

;.1.

8

two dollars to thirty-four li.ollars
per capita. Tratie, both foreign
ana domestic, increased by leaps
and bounds. The prices of staple
articles rose. Labor was in increasing Qemanci at higher and
higher wages. Cor~orations, firms,
communities, and individuals rivaled each other in incre~sed expenditures. 14

Such reports of the United states' great financial
stability during t ne ten year period
a clear lJicture.

(18~7-1807)

fail to present

It would be more accurate to state that the

vast majority of t LJe people assumed the boom }Jeriod to be that
of a high economic normalcy, but in reality it was but the false
prelude to the bubble's bursting.

The financial aaolescence of tne United States was
based on the strl1f(gle from infancy to the attainment of maturity
in a feriod of a little over one hUndred years.

T iJiS

strug~le

was based u;,Jon the eagerness of the peo}Jle to succeed, to defeat
youthful inex1Jerience and to gain the reSlject and admiration
t.tlat is given to an adult.

But, the country had no traditional

policy to follow, no economic history to draw upon and no desire
to accept guidance from the older nations of8urope.

Her

14 F.S. Mead, "The Panic and the Banks," Atlantic [,;jonthly,
101:273, February, 1908

mistakes were natural, although tragic to those suffering the
ill-consequences of immature economic navigation.

In desper-

ation, t he national government called uron reserves it did not
possess,

It attempted to Use such non-existent reserves to

obtain those things it needed.

Thus, began the vicious circle.

This created general uneasiness, "Jealth for ithe fortunate speculators, debt for the unsuccessful, and utter confusion for
the majority.

Over-spending, over-tradin::o:, over-production,

over-mining of gold ,_ over-construction, over-expansion by interior railroad building, and over-confidence did not help to
alleviate the strain.

The result naturally Vias the many cycles

of boom and prosperity followed by panic and derression, only
again to revert to boom, and the cycle started once more.
was at the end of this adolescence that the Panic
. of
place.

I~07

It
took

The vvri ter does not T!lTis 11 to convey the idea t nat these

cycles are a thing of the past; but, until this period, not too
much was done to correct the causes of sue h economic, corr;mercial-,
and industrial fluctUations.

As a result, measures were taken

to prevent rather th:-:m ease the ill-effects of financial qisaster in so far as they were able.

Adolescence 1s a d.elicate time of life when
habits, attitudes, and general all around mental as well as
/

10

•
physical health must be thoroughly safep;uarded.
well-rounded and acijusted adult will not blosSOll1.

Otherwise the
A nation's

llfe rpsembles to some extent tnat of t ne ordinary human indivicual.

At tins time our nation was a financial adolescent.

•
CHAPI'ER II
THE EVE OF THE OCTOBER PANIC

Judf,ing from external cond:i.t1ons, 1806 may be considered a year of great

Commodity prices and the

~rosperity.

cost of living were hi2;h and a construction boom was apparently
in full force.

One reason for this was that builQing had fallen

since 1804 due to t he extremely high cost of materials.

Conse-

quently, people limited t ijemselves to necessary repairs and
1

slig11t improvement s.

The increased derDana for new construc-

tion projects was modified to a great degree b,i the aj-parent
unwillingness of investors to risk their money in such a dubious
venture as real estate at that time.
or no actual building construction

ViaS

~)uite

natural..Ly, little

undertaken.

Prices, how-

ever, slowly lowered and this decline set off the cycle once
more.

Investors were now more than anxious to risk" their money

in order to reap a rich harvest.

The stock piles of building

materials were slowly exhausted as t.E cycle began to gain momentum.

As a result in t he year 1;J06 t nere were frantic calls

for materials, workers, and financial assistance.

Such invest-

ment construction is usually follo'Yed by a stimulated increase

1 Hull,180
11

~--------------------------------------------------l~-~'
2

in necessity construction.

T ne tneory is t ,;at proo.uction

is stimulated anG general business is extenaed to a l)itch of unexcelled prosperity.
its selling factor.

But the price of any commoo.ity rei.;ulates
::n1.en the demand is satisfied a gradual sur-

pluS is built up; supply t hen exceeds demand and a slackening
'uerioa
sets in after t he levelling off.
-"

"),rIlen the payment is

halted a natural result is that financial and comwercial interests are accordingly affected.

It must be borne in mind that the rapid development and ecual1y sharp decline in work-promotinp: enterprises is
most ap;..;arent when viewed objectivply from a vantage point of
forty years.

However, those living at the time are usually not

able to distinguish tde chGi.nge and e,uite naturally conclude that
such financial ."'ood times are

norE~al

ano. 'will continue.

With tie general advance in construction

pros~er

ity all branches of gaining a livelihood quite naturally are
stimulated.

'1' De general field of entertainment receives more

than its share of surplus money and as a result stars such as tne
John Drews and the Mary Gardens rise with tne prices.

Clotning

manufacturers are encouraged to buy more goods as tile demand for

2 Hull, 180

..
their commodity is increased.

T his situation continues to flow

through the INhole fabric of daily living for peol/le are most
eager to maintain their station in life.

The price of food, likewise, soared because tne
farmer and the grocer insisted upon t 11eir share of the fruits of
t he apparent prosperity.

T he Roosevelt Pure Food Law improved

service and food in the many restaurants scattered t lJI'oughout
t ne country.

T his was done to such a degree that they were

patronized much more t llan in previous times.

It would be mis-

leading, however, to fail to mention that most entertaining was
done in the home.

This, in turn, necessitated the employment

of domestic help.

Such help was at a premium and as a result

was in a position to demand niF.':her wages ano. the best in INorking conditions.

Education, likei:vise, ViTas eX}.Jandea..
~£1ome

l'Jo jJros},Jerous

"yould dare admit that its c hilCl.ren wanted for anyt lung.

An

excellent proof of wealth was t 11e common statement to thee; effect
that the children attended this or that expensive ana exclusive
school.

When the head of t ne family possessed sufficient

resources to live on a hig her level t rlan his fat her, when nis
children are well fed, clot fled, educated, and given every possible opportunity to advance, when he has a sur 1)lus whic 11 would
enable him to dabble in stocks and bonds, then is he lulled into
a feeling of security in which the very idea of
to him and his is utterly abhorrent.

l~:ersonal

disaste

Such an attitude of mind

was far too general at this time and must biC' understood in order
that the entire spirit of the period in question be not uncomprehensible.

Disaster was 'waiting just around the corner for an

opportunity to raise its ugly head and start the chaos that is a
natural consequence of the fact that its warnings have been ignored.

On an early spring day, April 8, 1906, one year
and a half previous to the bursting of the Panic in all its
fury, a'terrible disaster took place on the Pacific ,Coast.

On

that day the city of San Francisco was utterly destroyed by an
earthquake and subsequent fire resulting therefrom; the loss in
human life was hig h for any city.

Millions and millions of

dollars in proI.:;erty values went up in smoke or had been shaken
apart by the earthquake.

The insurance companies bore the full

impact of the losses resulting from the earthquake and fire.

Disaster as well as war drain a nation's finances.
ital~

and property are destroyed.

Money, cap-

The disaster in San Francis-

co shook the financial fabric of the nation.

It was a most un-

fortunate occurrence but not the direct cause of the Panic as
Sprague points out:
••• but even if it [the 'Quake]
not occurred it is certain
t hat demand for adciitional capital ~vas outstriiJl~ing current
savings seeking investment. Increasing difficulty was experienced in marketing securities
of the very hiehest class. By
some ••• this difficulty was
attributed to the activities of
the national and state governments
designed to regulate corporations;
but it can hardly be supposed
t hat this surerficial view blinded those in responsible positions
in the financial world. The strain
upon capital Was world-wide, and
in the United States mu..nicipal
bonds whose sale would. have been
stimulated ••• co~ld only be
marketed when offered at 100'!er
prices or a higher rate of interest.
r~d

3

During the summer r:lonths, however, stocks and
bonds began to move again to higher grolLn.ds •

Dividends 1.'IJere

rather high and this Tl\!as all the assurance SIJeculators had to
have in order to stimulate investments.

T he large banks began

to receive capital from the smaller banks and the money in
3

Sprague~

Crises~

239

rF
r

circulation was thereby increased.

A large number of the in-

vestment establishments in t rle financial calJitol received the required reserve cal)ital from outlying community banks.

These, in

turn, felt themselves to be secure since their reserves had been
placed in famous New York institutions of banking and invest4

mente

Almost fifty-four millions of dollars had been secured

through the importation of gold.

'I'lus was brought about through

the negotiation of finance biJ..ls and the entire rflovement was (
eased to a great degree by deposits of funds of the government i
the banks against the gold.

Even the crop-moving demands were

successfully .met by the financial circles in New York without
suffering too much loss.

Some increase loomed on the horizon,

but by December the stock market began to decline.

As a conse ....

Quence, very stringent money conQitions returned.

T he year, 1807, opened brightly with the hope that
the beginning of the new year would be marked by an increased
flow of money into New York.

The New York banks, however ,. soon

found themselves in a difficult Fosition of being forced to make

4 Money in circulation increased nearly ~;100,000,OOO. Del;osits
in New York banks reduced the Treasury Department's holG.ings
$23,000,000. "State and other bonds 1J.rere accepted as security
for such deposits on condition tl~_t the banks should use the
re.leased United States bonds on a basis for further issues of
notes. If Sprague, 240

17

..
loans on t ne very loans which they had already nef,otiat ea'.

Such

jUf':'-',l.ing of f·..mas resulted in double 1iqtliaation ami brou,-; ilt
about the

If

Rich Men's Panic ll of February ana. j!larch, Itl07.

writer in the

IJ~j:;ion

points out this type of panic is

II

As a

•••

con-

ceived of as forced selJ.im-.r of stocks by cCi}iitalists woo are so
rich that tneir cre,dt cannot be toucnec.l, ann wilo are merely
cOlni~lelled

to reo.uce the

burd(~n

vlflich the] are

(~arr.ving

v.rith

5

bo:croVJed money. II

f.iuch a pan.ic occurs 1:'!nen the stock n:S1.rket

seems to i_romise an extensive rise.

The sf;ecuJ.ator purc.cases

more stock with t ne i(1ea in mind of unloading such stock W'ien
,Jrices reac t-J a

ni~

ner level.

T he reason tnis type of person

bcrrov!s money from t ne banks is due to t 1:18 fact t nat most of nis
'wealth is tied up in l"md, private business, and Dis regular
stocks and bonds.

Rat her t nan selling t lose tnin<s
!..

\~rnich

he

knows are safe ana souna in order to get the necessary fu..nds, ne
proceeds to borrow on t ne fact of his well established Gred.it.
Such financial manil-lulation is quite easily arranged.

The spec-

ulator simply l:Jledges ills real inv 0stments as Gollateral.
f

way he may borro';r,r enough
of doubtful value.

mon~:'y

This

to plunge into speculative stocks

He may even go one step furtller anu. invite

disaster by;",J.eciging nis new' pure (lases and t nus siJeeulate
furt [leI'.

In present day terms tnis is simply buyin2: on margin

5 "A Rich Men's Panic," Nation, 84:254, JViareh 14, 1907

'f

18

<".no i'1. our

()1"n

time lve rl(-3,Ve exr.;eri""[lJ:!eo

(3

too, too :;i:-J.i.!lfl.ll re-

suIt of such fin8.Ylcial lep;er(ieElain.

':,,?l.l he

st;-l.nds to IT',':d-(p a very

s2'ecul!:!ted stock rer8ins

Fl~ood

con~3tCJ,nt

)rcfit.
to

b

If the

ice of nis

rp.Lb.tive cJegl'ee h"" is

the .NEJ.tion correctly st:-l.t.es:

But, if he

.l.l.(C,S wholly ul.l.sjU(
en
the m2rket; if the 1,r5.c!?, hOT.h
of the n""~iTly-"ou:.~ nt stocl< ,gn(' of
the olde=;r holdtJ1e:s ••• ;ut U1; ;,s
collateral, falls ten OJ' tvrpnty
percent O!1 the Stoc}r :~xc;l;mp'e=;,
thp ••• million (oll;,;.r 0 ,,',::ere.t or
is Quite as much forced to 'Liouidate' as is the petty s~eculator
ca1J.f~h.t wit n::ln 'PXI18uste=;O i(18Tgin'.
• ••• SmalJ. s~ ecul8.tors c,c;ug.ht •••
soon reac h thp end of tkleir resources
and are 'closed out', leavin:-:; no
f:1orro forcer:!. sr:iles 1:; 0 C0i1e I'ror"
that ClU)::.rter. The t.::n-milJ.iondollar r.1an, ••• may rrLise suf:L'i ~ient
c2sh, by sales on the Stock 'M,xchani:e
to reduce bis debt 2..:r]/; )rotect till=;
bulk of his sj,e=;cul;.:;ti ve ve=;''}'cures •
• •• hJs sale of stocks 1,,,ril.L not only
be 10ng-contj.l11J.Pd, but will be of a
P1c,gnitude:.)roortionen to tl'l2..t of
;~is s,;eclJ.lati ve comni tr;p:nt s.
6

Of course money is lost, hut his .s, pCld.,c:,tions ,He
visible=; SJ_i!,ns of individual distress or
6 "A Rich j"'en' s PBnic, tI 254

s.hal~y

S ()

:re",t th2.t

r:redi t ale

1.2.cl{int~

..
This in a word is a "Rich Men's Panic."

This "HichMen's Panic fl may be summarized as fo1lows: the sl;eculators were the largest buyers following the
August dividend's go-ahead signalj these men misjudged the market conditions; and, t

he

public did not purchase the stocks so
7

financially mani)ulated.

In a country where almost seventy-

five per cent of the business is carried on a cas n basis, such
a panic merely brings about an already overly aggrivated money
shortage.

8

7 "A Rich Men's Panic," 254
8 This 1Nill be brought out more clearly in Chapter III where
the "run" on the banks is explained in detail

•
CRAPrER III
QCTOBER, 1907

The year 1906 gave ample eviaence of tile aPiiroaching financial storm but such evidence was ignored by the majori ty of

~:)eo'ple

throughout the cOll..n.try.

Speculators, both large

ana small, felt no com:;.mlsion to taper off t (;eir wild purchasing on slim margins.

To complicate matters, expert opinion in

Europe was over-confident that the finanr::ial. viTOrld in Amerlca
was sound.

European financiers were not slow in extending
1

credit to Americans.

It is e?-sy to unoerstand then the

events vyhi8h reached t LeiI' cJ.imax in October, 1907.

'I' .nrough

world-wide economic madness, the results could not nave been
ot~,erwise.

The unfolding of these events should not cause any

Shock for tiSY had been foreshadowed long before tIE Panic
really began.

The first sign of trouble came
when Cnar les W. l:!iOrSe, notable as
tIle constructor of a great ice company and the projector of a chain
of banks, E.R. Thomas, a young and
daring financier, and F. Augustus
Heinze, an engineer wno had gained
faille and fortune by his dealings in
copper, suddenly withdrew from the
1 Berlin Corresponaence, New York
Financial Section, 1
20

~yening

Post, July 21, 1906,

21

db"ection of the group of banks
which they controlled. 2

There was a strong rumor that t he Clearing nouse
3

Committee

had dictated this move.

TiIDse involved denied

this and stated ttat the changes were caused by t eir voluntary
action in order t hat they might devote t .£ir full energies to
4

their personal interests.

According to a headline appearing

in the New -5York -_
'l'imes
.. __. we read t tat
and Do·wn. It

II

Heinze's Coppers Dance Up

On October 17 the financial page carried these

news leads "Brokerage House Fails.

Stock Exc hange Firm Sus6

pends Following United

Cop~8r'

s 'Wild Course •••• II

If any

added proof were needed more information was given on the 18th,
relative to the Clearing House's aid to t be Mercantile National
and the entire front page s;read concerned itself with convey-.
8

ing the information t rat all 1.'iould be well.

Financial uneasiness began to spread while the

2 ili.Jilliam Inglis, "Reaping the Whirlwind, New York's Escape
from Bank Panic,1t J:-i..arper's Weekly, 51:1646, November 9, 1907
3 See Chapter V
4 Inglis, 1646
5 The Mercantile' s deposits amounted to ~~11,500, 000, New York
Times, October 16, 1907, 13
6 Ibid., October 17, 1907, 12
7 Ibid., October 18, 1807, 13
8 T he press had advertized poor financial conditions too well.
Opinion was given that their policy better change to a more
confidence promoting attitude before it was too late

22

Clearing House Committee was conducting its investigation. iNnen
the newspapers devulged a few facts of t cis inquiry in relation
to the misuse of invested ca[)ital, then the bankers became
alarmed.

In little time all institutions having financial neal-

ing s with t

118

board of directors of the suspect bank began

checking t ,eir records.
deeply concerned.

quite naturally t neir de;Jositors were

T 11ese "vere divided into two groups; the sus-

ricious ann cautious w.no drew out tneir savings before ti1es"Corm
broke; and the trustful souls

'WilO

believed that prosperity was

permanent and so no harm would corne to a financial institution
9

just because it was under investigation.

snortly after, Charles T. Barney, wno had been an
associate of t ne Morse group, resigned as presiCient of t lle
10
This only added fuel to tl1e
Knickerbocker Trust Company.
fire.

At the close of t ":e business day, October ~;1, the l~a

tional Bank of Commerce formally announced it would not accept
11
That evening a
c necks drawn on the Knickerbocker Trust.
group of bankers held a meeting at Sherry f s Restaurant and
spent t heir time deliberating t ne fate of the Knickerbocker

9 The Mercant ile was t ll.e second largpst of its kind in New York
City
10 IngliS, 1646
11 Ne~ York Times, October 22, 1807, 1

';:,
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•

12
Trust until the early morning hours.

In order to save face,

t [lis group guaranteed the huge sum of :$15,000,000 to tide the
strugr:ling institution over its financial storm.

The mox'ning

palJers, however, carried the news in full detail.

The riublic

becarlle alarmed upon reading the story.

Hours before the 1nicker

bocker Trust opened its doors on the 2i:.:,nci, a long line of orderly though thorouGhly anxious depositors\"Jere l=atiently waiting
to withdraw their money.
dication that the Panic

TIns was the first actual and real inWB.S

underway 'when the general public

showed signs of its lack of confidence in t.he l<nickerbocker
13
Trust.
The line of hopeful yet fearful de..':)ositors extended
14
for blocks
and during the long perio6 of waiting it beca~e
necessary for the New York City police to issue numbered cards
so that those wishing to take time off to eat might return again
15

to their place in the long l:lne.

By half-past one o'clock
that afternoon [October ~?8J the
Kniekerbocll:er Trust COtlp8.ny had
paid out nearly ~~8, 000,000 of
its own money, and the run of
eager depOSitors was as insistent as ever. :tifo help was forthc,oming from other banks [the
$15,000,000 pro~ised the night
U~ Inglis, 1646; Ne\! York Times, October 22, 1~07, 1
13 Alexander D. Noyes, "The Financiol Panic j.n the United
states," Forum, 39:293-294, January, 1~08
14 See App~llaix B.
.
I5 Noyes, .t"l.nancl.al Panic, n 294
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before could not be raised
and cash was no where to be
found J. The officers of the
,company, ordered all payment
stopped. The business of the
concern was indefinitely 16
sus pended • The news vms knovm
instantly allover tOl.m. Blind,
unreasoning fear s>read everywhere. 17

October 22 was a day to be remembered in the
18
The flow of call money to the threatened
financial world.
banks was spasmodic and even the President's speech at Nashville did little or nothing to alleviate the seriousness of the
19
'The next morning a !lrun ff began on the Trust
situation.
20
Company of America and its branch, the Colonial Trust Company.
The newspapers, through their adverse criticism" had played a
leading part in bringing forth the full force of the scare.
They were advised to tone dov<!l'l their news stories.
not such warning there is little likelihood that the

If they had
~New

York

Times on October 23 would have carried a front page spread assuring its readers that the situation '.,ras 'well in hand and would
16 New Xor~ .Tj:.:~, October 23, 1807, 1
17 Inglis, 1648
18 N~_l~ Xm:li}~.1:;nw~~, October 23, 1807, 5, 15; "Exeunt Hoosevel t
and Bryan/, ft H?-.r..pe!:_!_§. .}~eeKhy., November 9, 1907, 51: 1640-1642,
stressed t he fact that tf:le President knew of the ap~Jroach
ing Panic but was determined to carry out his stubborn policies
19 New Yo~~ Times, October 23, 1907, 1
20 Ibig.

,····
"

~
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be cleared Uf' shortly throu?;h the efforts of J. P. l!lorgaTI and his
fri'?nds.

At this time it may be stated th3,t the statutes
chartering trust companies made no provisions for them to perform a general business or to accept demand
public.

6.e~)osits

from the

No cas b reserve 'was necessary to be used against tlJe

deposits and these companies livere legally able to invest in real
estate, deal in buying and selling stocks, and to lend money on
21
Such privileges had been denied to delJosit
real estate.
banks and these 'were carefully checked to see that there Vlerp. no
infringements.

Insurance companies, likewise, vrere not restrict-

ed and t hey wit h the trust companies were free in their movements
in financial affairs.

Together they covered any requirements

made of tnem by depositing their reserve capital in banks.

These

bankS, however, were only E;uaranteed twenty-five :per cent of the
total sum.

In tnis manner, liabilities were protected according

to technical means but the wholE'? cre,dt system was entirely too
broad and loose to vvi t;hstand any unforseen bloV'T on the financial drop.
Another important fact 1!ifaS that the trusts were
21 Banking Law of New York State, Article IV, Section 156

26

able to clear, or exchange checks

throu~~h

the facilities of the

Clearing House, even though they were not members.

It was in

this manner that the National Bank of Commerce was ablA to refus
any further clearing for the Knickerbocker Trust Company.

On Wednesday, October 23, a committee of five bank
22
oresidents

was formed "to receive applications for as-

x

sistance, make examinations, and rel)Ort to meetings of all trust
23
companies."
T he foundation of this committee helped to bulwark the sagl,);ing spirits of an already disheartened population.
This was one instance where the bankers were truly honest and
helpful.

The

amo1L'1ts.

Bonds were deposited by tile trusts; these were turned

co~mittee

was ahle to transfer money in large

over to national banks which, in turn, used them for additional
24

government deposits.

On Thursday, however, this situation grew very
serious.

As a rule panics subside after a few i1ectic hours but

this one continued to grow worse.

T De part of t ne Stock Exchang

22 The loan committee consisted of James Cannon, Vice-president
of Fourth National Bank; Henry Davidson, Vice-president of
First National Bank; Walter Frew, Vice-president of Corn Exchange Bank; Gates McGorrah, President of l'IIecilanics National
Bank; and, Albert "\:1liggins, Vice-president of Chase National
Bank
23 Sprague, 254
24 Ibid.
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in the Panic brings this picture into much clearer focus.

The

busiest part of the Stock Exchange is the "money post It vlhere
loans of cash are made.

This is usually the most crowded place

in the entire building.

On Tuesday, October 22, no loans were

made before noon and on the next day there was no business at
all.

Thursday was the most nerve \\Tackin..g day in the Exchange's

history up to that time, as the market was verging on sheer
25
panic.
At this very critical time the entire financial
structure of the Exchange was saved

tem~.orarily

through the
26

combined efforts of J.P. Morgan and his associates.
placed

~~25,OOO,000

into the money market.

They

A fel'v moments Vre-

viously small amounts of call money b8came available and these
were bringing 120 per cent interest.
27
time.

Relief aP.;Jeared just in

Meanwhile, George B. Cortelyou, Secretary of the
Treasury, boarded a train for New York and when he arrivea personally deposited $25,000,000

of the Treasury surplus with

25 Inglis, 1649
26 "The Men Who Saved the Day, ff HarDer' ~ VlTeekly, 51: 1646, November 9, 1907 lists George F. Baker, Dumont Clarke, Alonzo l~p
burn, William Nash, Thomas Ryan, James Stillman, and J.P. Morgan as the financial saviors
27 Inglis, 1649
28 New York Times, October 24, 1907, li but, Noyes, "Financial
Panic," states that the amount was ;W40,OOO,OOO

28

•
the national banks.

On t hat same day, J,![r. Rockerfeller stated,
29
III propose to do my part to t :ne full extent of my resources. n

Yet, this extra aid, was not sufficient, though it was a lifesaver to some extent.

The banks were unable to n1F;et the heavy
30
withdrawls demanded of them and began to stall payments.
It
waS their clear-cut intention to make a long dra1Jm out process
of what ordinarily VI"ould consume a few minutes.

In t[US way the

banks iNould still be functioning but the cash turn-over would
not amount to much.

It must be remembered that the heavy demand

for cash precluded the rec'3.iition of new depOSits.

As a result,

all the money was being withdrawn and. none vms being deposited.
Hence, precious time, as well as money, was extended.

To add to

the utter confusion anti turmoil, tIle small inland banks became
Dighly concerned over the status of their reserves "which they
placed in reputable Ne l N York banking institutions for safe keeping.

They began to nave "runs" in

their local communities and

called for t he reserves held in TJew York.

T Ins state of affairs

made it necessary for tne New York banks to insist on a sixty
day notice before they would return any deposits.

T Ius occurred

on Saturciay, October 26, just four days after the "run!! on the
Knickerbocker.

Saving banks issue6. a formal notice to the effect

29 Noyes, "Financial Panic," 299
30 Ibid.

29

that only after a si:z:ty day notice "wulct
witfJdraw t heir money.

depo~itors

be able to

Consequently, a large percentage of the

money deposited would be tied up; the Panic would have time to
31
subside; thus, the 'zeneral rush could be eased.

When cash becBn:e short, many dire
lowed.

conse(~uences

fol-

Some shrevrd people wrote checks instead of making direct

al'plication to the banks for their money.
fortunate and particularly

promin~mt

In this manner the

depositors Viera sllccessful

in obtaining their IlJoney during the first day of the "run It •

The

large trust corrrpanies sent messengers to secure their reserves
32
lvhich they had kept in lochl associate trust institutions.
J.~aturally,

these were given every IJreference and by the time the

regular, small dei!Ositor reached the teller's cage most of the
available money had disappeared.
shortag~

of ready

cash occurs those who possess it naturally hold on.

In this

It is only too true that when a

vvay hoarding J:.ilayed a prominent part.

The fortunate de})ositors,

31 Noyes, "Financial Panic~n 300
:32 Messengers were necessary as the Clearing J:-iouse Association
had refused since 1802 to allow all trusts the privileges extended to members. Therefore, non-members were forced to revert to the ancient practice of sending messengers to casn
checks if the Association refused to grant tl1.em t.rus service

~~----------------------------~~---~~\
\'
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lacking faith and confidence in banking institutions, were 0.833

termined to hold tight until concH tions werp corr8cted.
T riree immediate res1..uts followeQ fror::l this.
of money; secondly, tne offering of

8.

First, the hoard.ing

lJre!:'ium for currency; and
34

t nirdly, the issllCJ..nce of C1eA.ring House certificates.

cess of

2~~0

Betv.reen August and December of 1907 a sum in ex35
millions disap}jeareci from the banks.
This huge

amount was not hoarded by timid dej-ositors, but by the peoJ.Jle
as a 1Jirhole.

The fRar t ha.t a s nortage in r')cney would ret ;.'1.. rd the

merc::ting of normal obligations was distressing.

T he Comptroller

of the Currency reported tll8.t banks outside of the cen"Lral reserve cities were able to gather extra reserves of cash tirrough
36
the nation-wide partial suspension of payment.
"The banks
of the ::Jouthern, Western, and Pacific States '[Jere the rforst offenders ••••

(They]

••• more t

h~ln doub1~d

t he amount of cash

37
reo.uired by the law."

33 The Astor Safe Compa.ny rented 789 safes during the first week
of t [Ie Panic or six times their normal amount, A. Platt Andrew, IIHoarding in the Panic,tt quarterly Journal of Economics,
22:294, February, 1908
34 Tr~se certificates are discussed in detail in Chapter V
35 Andrew, "Hoarding," 294
56 Report of the ComptrolJ_~ of t l1e Curr8ncy, 1907, 1;'ashington,
1907, 69-71
37 Andrew, ft Hoar6ing," 299

. \:.::.
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•
With the withholding from circulation of such
large amount s of ready cash, it became neces sary for t fle issuan~e

of premiums for

market 03)eration.

curre::1.t~y.

This is nothing but bla.ck

This means that cash holders were encouraged

to bring forth their rnoney from their private vaults and llUt it
:~8

in circulation after they had bec.>n given an extra bonus.
On Novep1ber 12, t he premiums were ,as hig h as four per cent.

39

Despite all the pressure to pr9vent or break up such hoarding,
little cash was obtained from such premiums.

Cas n

1f.Ti:iS

scarce

and anyone fortunate enough to have it, was determined to kee.p
it, four i)er cent or no four per cent.

In regard to Clearing House certificates and conditions of the banks, full details will be given and

ex~lained

in a subsequent chapter concerning the great debate on those
institutions and
~he

J.~ersons

who contributed most toward alleviating

deplorable situation.

It fol101","S, naturally, that when a shortase of
money occurs business necessa.rily becOD1es forced to susiiend

38 See Appendix C
39 "Disa.ppearance of the 'Premium on Currency'," Nation, 86:44,

January, 1908

operEltions as well as the banks.
depression.

This d0velops into an ensuin8

The time of the Panic, hov,rc,ver, found the average

wage winner worldng but not paid.

His sfl.vings 'were tieduj.J be-

cause of the banks r closing; his credit almost

disa~. lIje::'tred.

With the 11.71101,::: e80nomic stru8ture under fire, the
logi8,'J. l question in everyone T s mind vIas, who are the guilty?
After the first shock carne the c:uestion of "That must be done to
correct the situation?

And as in all matters human, the third

question w:nich followed 1~as, who did the most to solve the first
two?

CHAPTER IV
~

'~\iHAT

~~o.ny

w-riters at t:n.e time l)lacen. full res.or\sibil-

finan~ial

ity for the

CAUSED ':tHE IJANIC?

Panic solely u:)on the banks.

The f13.grant

J:"isuse of banking privile;res by Horse ",till serve as an (:;xcellent
example of 1.',That tnese yTrit'?rs had in mind.
By sp.curing
sto~k,

10~3ns

on the colj.ateral of one bank's

he used this Y!1oney to pl.1rchase stock in another bank.

Tnrough this method he vvas able to control at least a half dozen
1

banks.

Through

fin~mcia.l

manipulation of tilis kind the de-

;.'osits of the banks he (!ontrolled vrere used by him in a series of
g8.mbling and s"eculc:.1.t;i ve deals with o.ire

~onse(:uen~es.

Tne btock

Exchange as a result I:'ras thrown into a state of nec.:..r-.lxmic.
But it must be

~e>inte().

ow:; that j,;orse alone was

not a.ble to bring about the entire uptJeaval in New York.
vrere

ec~ually

guilty.

ot 11ers

The bankers risked their de.posits on vihat-

ever sui tea their personal ideas vvi thout rec;ard to tne financial
risks involved.

Feel est8.te was the bulk of tDe banl<:ers' in2

vest8d money.

Of course real estj.te provides

;-1

sma.ll .trofit.

1 "Corrupt Banking and the Pani~, T! Nation, 87: 40::::, October ~:;j,
1908
~~ uTwo Causes of the Financial CollrJ}.)se, IT Nation, 85:598, December 26, 1907
33
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Furthern"ore, even a supposer"ly

reserve of 1'i VA to e uoven

cent turned out to be inadec;uate even though it

,I?T

~3t

S8 f8

the time to be safA.

W2.S

thought

T he country banks '1 e posi tAd in hew York

City three-fifths of their fifteen per cent which was the cash
renuired to be on hand.

S!:1 C:c.l

In turn, thr> l8rp:e trust co[[:;;anies

Ler bc:nks and the trust corniJa.nies

1";::tS

such that each de-

4

It is patent then that such

ended on t .'ll? cre0.i t of anothpJ'.
r/?,liance of one bEi.nk
post dangerous.

11);011

another for re-G0J)ositl?o reserve 'Has

Each instlt'ltion, by using t ne rpservp capital

of another bank deposited in it for sl)eculation and unsound
loans naturally left the depositinp banks with little or no capi tal.

Thus 'rhen the Panic broke upon the ftnancial rIOT'1d few

hanks had sufficient reserves.

It was just a C,'lse of not fol-

lowing the' stipulations of the National Banldng Law 1'I.'ruch re(ntred a t".renty-fi ve per cent reserve.

If tnere hact been only

a fellt offenders in this regard, then in all

l~robability

there

would !lB.ve been no Panic or at least one of very snort duration.
But such

1":::).8

ItThe normal

not the c!=J.se.
CO'i1{~i t

for emergencies.

As Spraizue so cleci.rly }Joint s out:

ion of tIl8 banks

l'.rpS

one of lack of:JI'e}'aration

No adecuate lending power or surplus cash

3 lfThe Aftermath of Panic, II Natio!1, 85:454, j\iovember 14, 1;;)07
4: Ibid.

I~
,
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..
reserve was avaL. . able at any time except during periods of trade
5
depression •••• "
This was the only time that the banks had
feper borcovrrers ;:mr5. sUrl)lus cash.

Generally, it was felt t Dat

this was the ccndltion ann nothing could be done about it.

Tne

bi:nkS '''forked under [~ handic01.p 8.nd did not r('8.1ize it to it s

f1J.llpst extent.

Ultimately, the PA.nic of 1907
hanks.

"'8.S

2:ood for the

It showed clearly that .in an errerp;r->ncy the bFE1ks pere

snPllosed to do t 1rJO things: first, to be 8ble to rr;eet all demands
for llTithdra 1Hl; and seconr-J...y, to increase its 10:1ns.

financj. . al conditi0l1S jJrevl'mted the banks fro)':1
)()c:;itors.

1I11hen

.subsequent

8cr~ui.r:i.ng

new de-

these conditions were not [IlF:'t, 11<"'0-,:le den1A.ll.oAO

th8.t the banl-{s be refor[.;ed.

At the time of Panic, however, thpre

was much (jj.scl)ssion but little action.
It may be o"':estioned 'xhy ttl<" crisis oeveloped
and c"-mtered in NeT York.

..rhis is e;:l.sily explained by the fact

thFl.t t he trusts were incorporated emd confinerl thpir financiA.l
i'~ctivity in New York. "Its J,roxin;ity to BurOI)ean bankj. . ng centprs

rlaced it in a most advantageous spot; even Canadian investors
f,=-,und its location rnost convenient.

Yet

1lTe

b':::'d.r in ;, ind ths.t,

although the Pa.nic bei:;:on, in New' York, it did not confine il,self
5 Sprague, 216

36

..
to that city.

Chapter VI deals with the

geographi~

location

of this' 1.lVorld-wide financial condition.

The bankers themselves feared a financial crash
before the generaltlublic became suspicious.

As a result t ney

cornered all the available money they could and held on to it.
In a word, the bankers became tie first hoarders.

T heir next

step was the flat refusal to repay their depositors.

Under

such conditions, business in general could no longer secure
loans 8.-"Yld thereby was unable to fun.ction properly.

1;\Then busi-

ness fell off, the bankers thus injured tneir own cause.

No

financial institution can endure over a long period when fresh
money is not available.

In regard to foreif,n loans, t nese uis-

appeared when American credit disappeared.

As a result, Eur-

opean trade fell off when American business

slu~ped.

When the New York bankers had expanded to an unsound financial ;condition theY were naturally forced to call
in their loans.

This action forced the borrmvers against a

financial 1Nall.

Since United states' banking laws did not re-

quire a set ratio bet1Neen the bank's capital and its liabilitie
6
over-expansion was only natural.
In such a situation

6 Joseph F. Johnson, flT.he Crisis and Panic of 1907, fI Political
Qcience~~~, 23:459, 1908
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aaenuate lending power or surplus c&sh woul6 not be available.

To COIniJlicate matters even ft:trt 1191', t ,1.e 0.e1_osi tor
b;c,nks demandeu t neil' money just as the
banks was at its )eak.

I!

run II on the New York

In a desire to shift the blame, the

Yorkers castigated the del-i0si tor banlrs

and~)articularly

i~ew

t nose in

7

As to the fairness of this we are not concerned.

t he West.

The practice of depositing reserves in banks of other
was a rather duhious venture at the time.

ci~ies

As a writer in the

Hatton points out: 6,178 of the 6,544 national banks were 'vhat
is termed 'country banks'.

These had to deiiosit trlree-fift 1.1S
8
of their fifteen per cent which was a re(uired reserve.
In
order to secure their business the l::trge city banks offered to
lAY

in.ter'est on this reserve so t hey might us'" it for their ovm

l!1.J.rl'Ose.

As a result

cities and

~;420, 000, 000 "ras

~201,OOO,000

I)laced on dellosi t in large

was kept as cash on hand to meet the de9

f:1!::mos of local

dp~:'ositors.

Since the Ne,cr York h8.nks had lent

",ost of the, cas h belonging to def·osi tor banks they 1~!ere naturally
10
unable to meet the hurTied call ror such money.
7 "Who Was FiespoYls.ib1e for the Panic'?," Nation, 85:575, December

19, 1907
8 "The Panic of 1907," Nation, 86: 51, January H3, ID08
9 Ibid.
10 Alexander D. Noyes, "Recovery from the .nec':;nt Panic," Forum,

39:483, April, 1908
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1".ihen t he Panic broke , it s full
t

(,e

f(\r(~e

fell u.;;;on

nation81 banks And in particular on tllose located in cen-

tr8l reserve cities.
not sufficient.
. t
pOll1

Tile holdings of all national bc<nks FJere

It amounted to less tn.an ;:;',1700,000,000 as t.clead

t i•••
l t [ley V"ere li3.01e to_ be cr:.l18d on for :.:;" :-';50,000,
s ou:

000 del.-;osits of banks of their own class, an.d also ~(:~480,OOO,000

de.)oslts of thl? state banks, )""lot to nention the ~nOO,OOO,OOO
11
(:~erosits of tne saving be.nks. II
It was never intended that
ti~

national banks were to share the benefits or obligations of

tne trust or sElal..Ler banks' resi1onsibilities.

Hence, they were

not er;ui.rJped to meet the serious dema.nds placed u.J..,on them. 'The
J:'1ational banks carried the de)osits of the state banks' reserve.
~hy

such a situation was ever allowed to develop in the first

place is a more ir'J)ort2nt ('uestion than the locl:!.tion of the
st::lte barLl{s' money.

'1.' nis is the reason w'fly bank reforrf'ers de-

manded two separate banks, clearly disti::1ct or one bank 11.'herein
12
full res ~onsi bili ty could be p12.ced.
Sprague felt that
even '':il-h emerf:ency measures it v!oulri have been

(~Hi te iF~~

for the national banks to meet their full r;:;sl-,onsibility.
L3
advocated reforms.
In a~l fairness, it is a Question

oS3i ble
he

11 F. S. J\Tead, nThe Panic and the Banks, tI Atl antic J:!:onthly,
101:275, February, 1908
12 Ibid., Nelson W. Ale.rich, 'I'h~ 1Nork of the J'~ational Fonetarv
Commission, 61 Congress, 2 session, Senate DocuP.1l?nt 406, iNas (Jington, 1909, 15
13 SiJrague, ;:-~16-3:::!l

,
"

,.
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l'Jnether or not the banks should receive so large a sl1are in the
b.Lame for the Panic of 1907.

The banking laws as I'Jell as the

bank managers should s r.l8.re in carrying t he blame.

T tIe bankers

knew full well that business could not possibly be stable while
t j:lere was a lack of reserves and it was (or them to see t nat
comprehensive laws shoulo. be passed safe-guarding t.i1e banking
business.

They had the best opportunity to discover where the

weaknesses were and what remedies could be employed to dissipate
such weaknesses.

It is amazing hoTJv suctl unscrupulous people

could ever acrueve such resyonsible yositions of trust.
t 'ney do then the blame falls

u~_on

t

Vfuen

hose in charge of trusted

financial institutions for their utter failure to carryon tneir
work with that integrity, honesty, and public interest so necessary in their position.

Making due allowance to human frailty

it is peculiar that the majority of the bank managers at that
time possessed such a low degree of

~ersonal

honesty.

Many people blamed politicians in general and tne
14
PreSident, Theodore Roosevelt, in particular.
Some believed
that his trust breaking tactics

le~d

many businessmen to the

stubborn conclusion tmt it would be a good lesson to his administration if a public panic should occur.
14 "Who Was ResponSible," 575

Though the source

r r - - - "- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~

.'

"

1!'lriters of the time 00 not put t r!is in so many words, they do
15
16
seems
state it.
"T.he notion of a 'Roosevelt panic'
17
and, "Politically,
not to have passed into folk-lore •••• ;"
18
II
are but a
Mr. Roosevelt will be held responsible
few of the commentaries.

The Nation's financial writer seems

strike a fairly accurate explanation Vrflen

h(~

stated that much

mud-ttlTowing is exchanged during a presidential election year.
This is only too true.

It might even ino.icclte that the finan-

cial slump may have been the normal tapering off of business
which is all too common during a campaign year.

The usual

reason for this is that Big Business wants to hold off until
the election returns are settled.

It may even be stated that

the autumn of a presidential election year is one of watchful
waiting.

fuwever, many blamed Roosevelt as the chief cause of

the Panic in view of his prosecution of the trusts, his J,Jrogram
of railroad regulations, his backing of the o.emands of labor
against capital , and lns conservation program designed to stop
Big Business' exploitation of natural resources.

hoosevelt in

turn accused the trusts, t he bankers, t ne railroad. men, and
other exploitprs of causing or aiding in the Panic.
15 Johnson, "Crisis,fI 464; Alexancier D. Noyes,"A Year After the
Panic of 1907,1t Quarterly Journal of Economics, February,
1909, 190
16 "The Roosevelt Panic and Its Predecessor," Harper's Weekly,
51:1787-1788, December 7, 1907
17 "Legends of the PaniC," Nation, 87:422, October 28, 1908
18 "T his Week," 'Nation, 85:433, November 14, 1907
19 "Panic and Politics, ft Nation, 86: 247, Marc h 12, 1908
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The President may have given cause for this attack
through his excited and sweeping comITlents.

These should have

been made with tact and diplomacy or it may be that his advisors
misinformed him.

Regardless of all this, it is quite absurd to

insist that the banking failure and general speculation were his
sole reslJonsibility.

Because as a writer in the Nation ponders:
20
Poosevelt was mistaken but was fundamentaLLy honest.

Nlany of the dire conseouences of the Panic have
been attributed to the speculation carried on at the time.

To

gamble with one Ts ovm cash is no crime but to take money willingly which belongs to another and use it on highly risky financial ventures can not be justified. , either
sound business princirles.

ethi(~ally

or on

It will be only a ([uestion of tiI?e

until such financial manipulations are discovered.

'l'he risk to

one T S self and to the entire community can in no V'Jay compensate
for any possible gains.

The speculation in the

1~07

financial

world most assuredly played an imj ort;::mt role in bringing about
many of the tragic economic results.

Another cause of the

finan(~ial breakcLO\~m

may be

20 "This 'Week, n Nation, 85: 390, October 31, 1907; Har:per and
other staunch Republican publications fully accused Roosevelt
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attributed to the
OD

curren~y

problem.

,"7ith speculators working

credit, with banks conducting business on small re:"erves,

with the entire l,opulation over-s i:ending , with in(ustry overoroctUcing and t.ne nation as a whole over-confident, it is only
.
21
logical that the ~urrency ~ould be jeapordized.
Uncier the
-

existing

curren~y

system, however, there was no way for the

volume of money to be expanded and the banks vv'ere in a way un22
able to help themselves.
As J:/arburg says there is no vis23
ible remedy for this difficulty.
Many writers of the period
believed that it was time for a rpwedy to he devised whereby
~urrency

1TiTould become sOlmder and more flexible in order to give
24

so~e

elasticity in periods of stress.

On the other hand.,

others insisted that the money was sound <md eVAn suggested that
25
it had never been in such a stable condition,
although a
26
scarcity did exist.
It ap,ears that i t was the policy of
many financial re:porters of the time not to act when in Cioubt.
;;:1 "Aftermath,n 454; the gold supply increased ::;6,700,000
22 Ja.mes G. Cannon, "Clearil'1..g Houses and the Currency, n 'l'he Currency Problem and the Present Financial Situation, Columbia
University Press, New York, 1808, 108
23 Marburg, 56
24 "Fina.ncial Conditions and Treasury Action, n Nation, 85: "±86,
November 28, 1907
25 Noyes, "Financial Panics," 313
26 Evidently, Mr. Noyes changed his mind for both attitudes were
written by him, but for separate publications; "A Year After,ff
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 194
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Fortu..l1ately the nation's legislators ?!ere more interested and
27
something was done.
At the time there 'VIas a 'powerful pressure group interested in currency reform and this group had the
backing of the press as a

\~rhole.

In the months preceding the

actual Panic much had been printed in the daily papers advocating
reforms.

The pressure had reached such a st:.;.ge in the daily

press that the whole cur:cency problem was CalH)d into question
and t au.s the fear wasprorfJoted that disaster was in tile offing
un.18ss somet hing V'Tere done.
f8ar which caused the Panic.

T nis in turn may h8.ve increased the
The platform of t {Jis g;roup con-

sisted of demands for an elastic currency, financial solidarity,
28

and a central bank.

In attempting to discover the causes of the Panic,
four things have been stressed; namely, tne banks, the PresiClent,
oV8r-speculation, and the currency_

Many other conditions were

pr8sent which contributed to the financial d.ebacle, but the four
E:entioned above are 'the most important.

It will be noted that

of these four, criticism bas been gi vt.'m by the actual observers
of 'the role played by each.

27 See Chapter VIII
?8 Johnson, "CriSis," 464
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such name cal-Ling '.'las just another vray of hlalJling Bip; Business
when the real cause~) \TJere too involved to figure out.

In at-

teillo,ting to understand such attacks on tnt:; CCil_'italists, one
thing cornes to mind.

The R.oosevelt Acministration ha.d given

many hard blows to trusts.

As a result most

peo~le

came

~o

the

80nclusion that the trusts Emd the men who controlled them y.'ere
entirply evil or tney were good men and should be ::,iven their
just due.

Eac 11 group insisted on the validity of its o)inion.

Those who were in favor of the trusts

s~,Jread

tile nevrs of the

beneficial support given to the banks by Big Business.

Those

who disagreed insisted that the trusts brought on the Panic and
subsequent der'ression.

A.s the eetitor of Harper 1 S

lt ree'kly

states:

It may ••• be here set down
••• that the only living man ~ho
could have prevented ruin ••• was
J. P:i,erront J-,;;organ, and that even
he ••• 'Nould rlave been he11Jless
but for the unqualified support
rendered by ••• James Stillman,
George F,. Baker, John D. Rockerfeller, Thomas F. Tiyan, and the
two venerable trust presidpnts Edward King and Levi· P. l\:Torton. 2

;Some held, quite strangely, that anything connected viTith finance
was good.

The

fev~

banks guilty of

s(~uan().eI'ing

in unsouno. speculation formed a minority.

2 "Exeunt Roosevelt, n 1640

depositors 1 money

The majority according
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It was fortunate trlat some financial

to Inglis, were silent.
leaders possessed

s-L~fficient

resources ana. sagacity to control

tile situation; ot herwise the Panic might have been ·imrse but t {ley

succeded in checking the "runs" on the banks.

With the loosening

of the money situation the crisis ceased and the Panic stopped
4

almost as abruptly as it had begun •.

Boastfully, those who

favored the above opinion l:oint out t l1at t he bankers dumped $50,
5
on the money market
000,000 to the government' s ;~~25, 000,000
at the psyc n.ological moment.

And t Ius was SUPl:osed to have saved

the day.

Of course a third or middle of the road group existed.

They neither condemned nor condoned the financiers.

Their general reaction was t bat t he financiers' help was wonderful but too good to last.

To a gegree they believed that the

capitalists ,vere sincere when compared to their deplorable
actions in the panic of 1903.

At that time they vied with each

other to see vTho could ClO the most harm to financially embarrassed institutions in order to incor1Jorate t nem into t neir oVlJn
6

particular organizations.

D Inglis, 1646
4 Ibid.
5 New York Times, October 24,1
E:i "Who ,Nas Responsi hIe?," 575-576
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They believed, furt nermore, that the financiers Vlrere neitner
t!1e saviors nor tne der:;ons as the pro and con groups insisted.
'I' /le/ held that they aid give a great mea.sure of financial aid

to the banks; but pointed out at the same time that t fie interest
cnarged was exorbitant wnen one consiuers that t[US was an emergency.

T ne role played by Georce B. Cortelyou, Secretary
of the Treasury, l·vas exaggerated out of all prol)ortions to its
real worth.

Naturally, the Administration proclaimed this sup7

posed fact that it had saved the day.

Before Cortelyou's

8.ssumption of office, the previous Secretary had left a sur plus
unaer the heading of cash balance available to be parceled out
8

among banks.
names published.

The recipients of this money never had their
It seems t.i:1at they were cnosen without any

r nyme or reason to such a degree t .hat some banks had been given
8

deposits equal to or greater than their entire cal)ital stock •.

7 Harper's Weekly, 51:164:0, November 9, Ib07 publisned a letter
1II.rritten by President Roosevelt to Cortelyou on October 24,1807
which stated' in part, n ••• I congratulate 1I10u upon the admirable way in whiC(l you have handled the .oresent crisis •••• "
8 "Washington Notes,n Journal of PQ,.litical Economy, 15:624, December, 1907
9 Ibid., immediately following his tenure of office, Shaw entered
Wall Street as a financier. This clarifies statements of his
over-friendliness with banking interests
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It seems that tnere was little need for the bRnks to worry bece.nse they had been assured that the money would only be called
for i!l o.n errergency, and t hey would be notified in sufficient
time.

Cortelyou's policy was to c h.::J.nge t his system in order to

bring about a complete separation of the Treasury Department
from the influence of II'Tall Street and private business.

When

t he "Ric 11 Hen's Panic" broke in February and l',farch, naturally,
t ne neVll policy

He t nen· introduced an appointed com10
mittee to decide on future policy.
T he object was to take
~.KTas

delayed.

such surplus money and deposit it in stable banking institutions
through legal means, and further to keep the public informed as
to what measures 'lITere being taken.
,~.'eek

Now in August, 1907, a five

deposit plan ·was initiated and on October 20 the sum of

~~166 ,000,000

new plan.

was reported to ffive been used according to this
11
All went well until the October ffrun" on the banks

necessitated the Secretary's personal appearance in New York
12
City.
13
On October 23, Cortelyou poured $35,000,000
of federal money into New York

ba~~s,

the security given was

10 "Was hington Notes," 625
11 Ib~c;!., 626
12 New York Times, October 24, 1907, 1
10 $25,000,000 is the amount listed in the October 24, 1807 New
York Times, but ,~::S5,OOO,000 is what the Secretary states in
his Report to the Senate on January 29, 1908
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t<~very

based on municipal and railroad bond s.
made to stop the

l l n..mll

ef1'ort had been

and stablize both foreign anri cwmestic

14
business.

Nevertheless, the "run" del:,leted the available

cash.

It thus became nscessary for him to ask for the "coopera15
in reestablishing that calm wnich was so
tion of the press ll
necessary in time of strife.

One month later, the Secretary issued

~jaOO,

000,000

in thres per cent, one year notes, and $50,000,000 iFi txo per
eent bonds under the Panama Canal Act.

The circular was issued

in the middle of the mont 11 by the l'reasury Dep8.rtment and exl)lained that such money was to be deposited on the government's
account or that the banks could use the nelflT security for increasing their mvn note circulation.

The ban..ks, however, and
1-6

private individuals refused to take advantage of this offering
and in less than a week's time the sale of the three per cent
notes was susyended in an abrupt manner.

There had been issued

14 New York Times, October 24, 1907, 1; Journal of Political
Economy, 15:627, December, Id07
15 Nation, 85:390, October 31, 1807
16 The banks were substituting reserve money for the notes, wnic
were not legal as reserve; if the bonds acted as government
collateral, the banks would lose 16 to 25;1; on exchange. Eithe;r
way would force t 11e ban-.ks to redu.ce reserves during an urgent
cash shortage
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less than one-fifth of the entire amount Hnd this brought about
17
an end to the experiment.
Some held that these measures
18
1Nere undeniably inflatio:qary.
On the other hand, the Administration denied this and .()ointed Ol1t that bank statements
were up by November 17 and that t lJ.e first s til ,ment of gold had
19
arrived from England.

T he role played by the Clearing House
in the Panic is most interl?sting.
point s out,

It

•••

the banks ••• meet

...

A Clearing House, as Cannon

is a place where all the

...

to

~ertificates

re~uresentati ves

of

settle accounts with each other,

and so 'clear' the transactions of the day for WInch the
20

settlement is made."

The settlement of the day's business

is so important that only members are able to 'clear' througn
the facilities so set up.

There are tvm classes of Clearing

Houses; the first siml)ly clears notes, checks, and lH{latever
else is agreeQ upon; the second is concerned llVith the rules and
regulations governing the rates of

excha.nf~es

and charges.

The

most important funct'ions of the Clearing House are five in number: 1, loans to the goverrunent; 2, assistance to members; 3,

17
18
19
a:0

"A Financial Anniversary," Nation, 87:503, November 19, 1908
"Treasury Relief Measures," Nation, 85:460, November ~l., 1807
Ibid., 85: 486, l~ovember 28, 1;J07
Cannon, 97
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uniform rates for deposits; 4, uniform rates of exchange and
coLLection; and 5, the issuance of the Clearing HOU0e loan
21
certificates.

In actual operation the Clearing House demands
that each debtor bank pays its debtor balance before one tnirty
o'clock on the business day.

Then after that time, the creuitor
22
New York stands out for the
banks receive t neir balances.

rather rigorous conditions imposed on nOD-member banks, and for
23

the safeguards it has set up to protect its members.

Pre-

vious to January, 1808, no law of the New York Clearing House
demanded the twenty-five per cent reserve tnat tne member banks
held.

This is important in understanding the issuance of the

certificate loans.

T he first Clearing House certificates were issued
24

on October 26, 1807.
associate banks,

acti~g

They were temporary loans made by
as a Clearing House Association, to

~em-

25

bers for the settlement of their Clearing House

21 Cannon, 98
22 Ibid., 104
23 Ibid.
24 Sprague, 429; see Appendix D
~5 Cannon, 108

balances~
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During t he time of the Panic, currency I".":ould not be eX}landed
fELst

enough.

Thus it became necessary for the banks ,. acting

tflroup; h the Clearing House, to take proper ste:ps.

A loan cow-

mittee was set up C0r11)osed of five bank officials wit t1 tne pres. ident of the Clearing House acting in an advisary (x.1.pacity. T ne
certificates issued assumed the plar:!e of money that could I}ot 'be
obtained readily for the purpose of keeping banks on cre1iits
and debits.

The use of certificates was confined to the paymtmt

of the balance due to associate banks.

Cannon holds that without such certificates, it
vvould have been almost imrossible for the governmen.t to import
gold from Europe since the cprtificates created the absent
credit.

Such credit was essential, otherwise, imj.orts could not

be sent without the payment for tne transfers and bills of ex26,

c (lange.
tanto

T 11e interest rate on these certificates is im.i.JorSprague holds that the interest was beneficial as the

banks wished to retire their loans as soon as the crisis was
over and thereby Save the interest charged.
there 1vas not one instance in t

r:P.

N as h 110lds that

nine tines wnere the loans

26 Cannon, 111
27 Sprague, 184; he also considers t his issuance as the hig nest
form of bank cooperation but would discourap;e legalizing tnem
for this would destroy their success
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28
Despite the fact

were used ttat a sing..Le dollar was lost.

that it was rejJorted that the public did not lose confidenr;e in
29
tae loan certificates or with the Clearing House itself,
some hold that

SUCD

loans were tl1e cause of tne "general cash

30
It was also believed t nat the Clearing House

suspension lf •

certificates merely prolonged official stimuli to the currency
IJroblem and that their issuance merely added to the financial
i.11s.

This was due to their inability to be accepted on all

levels of exchange.

Whetner the day was saved by the let-iding capitalists, or by the Treasury action, or by the part piayed by the
Clearing House certificates, or by any other one factor is a
lJoint very difficult to decide.
from E:urope helped.

Perhaps tne arriva.l of gold.

It could be that ti1e finanr;ial interests

of the country were united in attacking a COIDF)On enemy and that
the efforts of all resulted in a confidenr;e
cause of tne Panic, fear and indecision.

~\I{Jich

broke t {]e

Confir;ence aid appear

but its appearance will be discussed in a more cOrrJi)lete picture
in Chapter VII.
28 William A. Nash, "The New York Clearing House," T he Currency
Problem and the Present Financia.l Situation, Columbia Univer, sity Press, New York, 1908, 92; see Appendix E
29 Ibid., 93
30 "Recovery frorn Panic, n 487

£lIAPTER VI

-FINA.NCIAL GCOPE

The Panic originated in New York City.
effect seems to have centered

on the

.Ba~tern

Its full

seaboard wnicn

depended to a great extent on the center of finance's heart
beat.

The comple"ce picture, however, 1"10uld be missing if the

i~pression

were given that the remainder of the country, as well

as the whole world, was not affected.

It must be remembered

t hat the West was blamed for hoarding its reserves and that it
was unwj.lling to ship these East.
V,T2S

During the emergency there

a feeling that Western financiers and smaller fina.ncial in-

stitutions had acted in an unorthodox manner.

Not only did t

keep their reserves but demanded that the New York banking insti tutions ref1.m.d their deposit s.

In 13.11 fairness, however, it

must be stated that the smaller banks did deposit their meager
reserveS in

Ne\~T

York financial lnstitutions and they felt quite

stronglY' that ttley should be the first to receive any refunds.
They beJ.ieved that they 'were a safeguard for the wnole nation's
economy and in particular during the I1run fr late in October.
Furthern10re the Wosterners were convinced that they had suffer
enough :in past financial panics and did not intend to become'
victims sacrificed on the altar in the East.
54

They stressed the
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fact that too much had been lost already in crop-movings and
in the San Francisco fire and eart 11Qua1,::e to
section to risk any more money.

j.~ermit

their

It is almost a truism that

those who possess the nation's purse strings possess them for
the very reason that they realize what they have and are tnereby unwilling to lose them no matter vrhat the urp:ency or reason
may be.

Naturally conditions throu?l1out the country were
not in the financial
large industrial

~haos

~enters

that existe.d in New York.

Of cou.rse

were affect8d quite severely

be~ause

they depended on th8 free flow of industry and rnanu.facturing.
In a word, the Panic

tou~hed

but not to the same degree.

a1.1 parts of the en-eire country
~,oreover,

Europe, Africa, ASia,

E.nu South America were affected almost as nuch as the United
States.

Even at this time t he financial web 11J'as so tightly

Foven that a broken strand in anyone place affected the whole
r!eb.
the

Today we have become fully convinced of this fact through
un~sentle

hands of hard experience.

Specifica.Lly, the Egyptian market collapsed all

most at the same time as the Japanese market fell in
1 Noyes, "A Year After," 202

A~ril.
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In the middle of October, Montreal felt the blol'v of its Stock
2
in far 8.vJay Hamburg, Germnay the worst upset
Exchange panic;
in the city's financial history v1T as experienced about the same
3

time.

T he Paris and Berlin exchanges reported on October 22

trlat their openings 'I;,rere firm but dropped sharply as the news of
4

the "runn on the Nev'\T York banks had rebched them.

Santiago,

Chile, Amsterdam, Genoa, and Copenhagen suffered severe crises
5

alrnost simultaneously
though not

sufferi~g

1~rith

New' York.

London and PariS,

from actual paniC, were forced to readjust

their financial structure.

This was done in the hope that they

1Nould escape the full force of the ",Torld wide financial blow.

It is understandable why London and Paris took
such measures when we remember the gold borrowing on the part of
the United States.

Both countries had a central bank and all.

finance revolved throug h it.

When the Panic struck financial

circles in the Uni t8d states and investigations J..:,roved that a
shortage of currency existed, it became
more gold in a hurry.

2
3
4
5

New York Times, October 16, 1907, 14
Noyes, uA Year After," 203
New York Ti~~~, October 23, 1907, 15
Noyes, ft A Year l.l.fter, n 204

hi~hly

imperative to get
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Naturally America turned to England for proof of her promise to
6

ext8nci. aici. if it were necessary.

The Grisis in Amsterdam

ann Hamburg had to a certain extent de}Jleted the usual gold
7
sur,:,ply held by f.i~ngland.
The Bank of H~lg1and was Gompelled
to borrow from the Bank of France in order to fulfill its
promises and at the same time safeguard the English economic
balance.

It would appear then that LonGon banks were in a sim-

i1ar plight with their American cousins.

But. this is not the

case, because the English insisted that a reSArve of at least
8

forty per cent be deposited with them.

Now when gold is

borrowed, some kind of credit is necessary to act as collateral
!for such borrow'ing.

But Clearing House certificates and

Treasury money served as a basis for our European financial
9

deals.

According to a writer in the Natj,_Q.l} vve borrQ1.r:red on
10
creci.it but were forced to pay wit h commodities.
The Bank

of England was forced, ciuring the crisis and panic, to continue
to raise its rates in orcier to SeC1ITe

pa~Dent

from other coun-

tries so that it could lend the United States the gold

6 New York Eve~igg PQ.st, July 21, 1~06, Financial Section, 1
7 Aldric h, Senate Document 538, ~'.45
8 ftPanic,1~07,TI 51
9 Cannon, 111
lO "Treasury Relief," 460
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11

requested.

With the arrival of gold shipments during November
and December confictence in the currency and general financial
picture ciel=larted from the fear steege and assumed the at'citude of
confidence once more.

As soon as this confidence

a~~eared,

the

Panic almost automatically was forced to disap i:-iear and the
crucial period had passed.

11 England's rate rose to 7% on November 7. During November
and December :;:;90,000,000 worth of gold arrived in New York;
~p73,400,000 from England al ne, Sprague, 284

..
QHAPrER VII
,..C0l1FIDE1'JCE

IS F{SSTORED

It is just as difficult to set a definite date
for the ending of any panic as it is to set one for its beginning.

One's fears and lack of confidence are intangible things

and it is quite hard to pin them down as having begun or ended
at this particular moment or time.
ter of choice.

Of necessity, this is a mat-

It was stated in the early chapters of this

work that the Panic of 1907 officially began on October 22, the
date of the J:(.nickerbocker bank "run".

Some explanation is in

order before setting a specific date for the end of the financial upset.

Some hold that this Panic ended almost as abruptly
as it began.

These give the date of October 24 because the fi-

nancial kings and the United States' Treasury had poured over
$75,000,000 into the money market to try to stabilize it.

1

others, on the other hand, are of t fie opinion that when the
certified New York checks were no longer selling at discount,
1 Inglis, 1646-1649; anot her reason was that confidence returned

with the issuance of Clearing House certificates and news of
gold arriving from England
59
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2

the emergency had disappeared.

This was on January

~,

1908.

T he rise of stocks and bonds in the Nev.r York Exc hange during
January, 1908 helped to build confidence.

This also is adduced
3

as an aciditional reason for their choice of this date.

Fundamentally, the two opinions stated above concerning the date of the ending of the Panic of 1907 are
a matter of personal opinion.

~urely

To a great measure they depend

upon the attitude of the individual as to where the credit sYtould
be placed for remedying t he financial upset.

Those favoring

Big Business interests maintain that the Panic ende(l when business interests placed its money on the open market.
of the United S tates' Treasury state

tl~t

The backers

the crisis was al1evi

ated as soon as the Department took active measures.

Those who

defend the Clearing House hold that its loan certificates gave
a formal basis for local confidence and intern;'J.tional security
for the newly imported European gold.

Another group maintains

tnat all materially aided in restoring confidence.

Wilen confi-

dence in financial circles was gradually restored, several things
happened.

The premium on currency was lowered and gradually

2 "Premium on Currency," 44
3 "Recovery From Panic Depression," Nation, 86: 2S5, Marc h 5, ItJ08
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discontinued.
AS

Hoarded money found its way back into circulation

a result, in January the Stock JVIarket was able to forge a-

head and banks began to show a significantly favorable balance;
business was given the necessary stimulus throug h these financial movements which breathed an air of confidence, security,
and safety.

For the purpose of establishing some definiteness
to the financial Panic of 1907, it may be safely stated that it
began on Tuesday, October 22, 1907 and continued until the last
day of December of that same year.

These ten weeks with all

their maneuverings sum up all the material mentioned heretofore
and constitute what is meant in this thesis by the Panic of
1907.

Of course this is the present writer's conclusion but

it is believed that t he facts adduced fully support such a conelusion.

Naturally, it would be a gravely mistaken iml1ression for anyone to assume that economic stability v!as cOfl1plete
established by the first of the new year.

At this time the New

York banks provided cash for their local depositors but not for
4

the inland banks.

These inland banks were not able to cas h

4 "Premium on CUrrency," 45
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t heir drafts in New York City banks.
dis~ount

They even eliminated the

demanded because they no longer required such extra

money due to the fact that t:ileir hoarded surpluses more than
covered t il.e demand for veri t hdrawls.

T he financial, commercial, and industrial picture
brightened considerably with the revival of confidence in the
banks and the beginning of business enterprises such as the reopening of the steel mills and the demand of ,[{estern and southern
5

buyers for dry goods.

It may be assumed t h:3.t recovery as

usual lagged behind the restored confidence even thoug h the
crisis had been passed.

Production had almost stopped and quite

naturally wages sto;;ped, too.
been injured.

Thus a.ll types of business had

The cycle needed a stimulus.

Demands for materi-

als from the sout h and west provided part of this stimulus but
much more was needed. . Basic den1 ands vrere present but money to
turn these into

a~tuality

was absent.

seemed to be one of watchful waiting.

The iiost-Panic picture
Since a nation's business

economy depends to a great degree upon money in actual circulation and when this condition is not fulfillea, the na.tural result
is then similar to a vaccum.

The ciomestic business picture slow-

ly and the foreign scene rapidly paralled it.
5 Noyes, "RecoverY,1I 480

It will be
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remembered that gold had been used in exchd.nge for agricultural
commodities.

America was fortunate in hC'lving a surplus whic n

coula. be used as an exchange item, but prices were low and so
'JlTere wages.

Reserves It'Tere not available to help in the begin-

ning of the cycle.

Furthermore, America was not the only

country injured by the economic UI)Set., T he entire world felt
its blow and foreign countries were not able to prime the commercial cycle.

Countries such as England and France, witnessed

no actual upset but they were alarmed by the necessity of exchanging gold for American use and found themselves, thereby,
under a heavy strain.

Unfortunately, the minor boom following

the January rise in the Stock Market soon turned into a world6

wide depression.

Fortunately, industry and commerce were not
completely paralyzed 'in America during the late winter and
early spring of 1808.

As Feder states:

If

•••

during ••• 1908

factories and shops operated on part time, and when they shut
down activity in other line~ offered employment •••• n

7

Never-

theless, no complete survey of the national unemployment scene
was made.

Yet some measure of its extent can be gleaned from

6 This work is not directly conr;erned with the 1908 dejJression;
consequently, details are omitted
7 Leah H. Feder, Unemployment Relief in Periods of DepreSSion,
Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1936, 189

64

•
ot her sources.

Immigration declined and emigration i!l-;re&:::;ea;

rAlief agencies reported a sharp increase of applicants'; and,
8

lOan cornpaniesexperienced a tremendous rush of business.
There was a dema.nd for emergency work to be supplied by the
government.

Labor demonstra.tions became widespread, even though

the depression of 1908 was not quite as severe as the one in
9

the late 1880's.

It must be stated, however, that the depression
subsequent to the Panic of 1807 is not the to 1-,ic of this work
but its inclusion is necessary to complete the l..ii,.::ture.

In all

justice, a few vmrds shoula be said about the role played by
the New York Stock Exchange 'which was intentionally passed over.
In order to avoid any confusion about the economic uj-'heavo...L at
its start, the Stock Exchange had been left for later treatmente

In summary form the following may be stated to clarify

the role played by the Exchange in the Panic of 1907.

The con-

census of expert opinion in financial circles is that the Stock
Exchange was not resljonsible for any over-extension or oversyeculation.

8 Feder, 192
9 Ibid., 197

The blame for this falls squarely u.r:Jon the

65

10

shoulders of business in general.

By consulting Appendix

F, proof is given that the changes on the Exchange took place
l:;revious to the October Panic and that no evidence of speculative expansion is indicated for the market was below normal.
Had general business been sounCi, the Stock l\f.arl\:et would have
slowly risen fo..Llowing its forced liquidation.

Meyer points out, furthermore, that no bank or
trust company failed during the crucial ten weeks because of
11

loans or investments in any Exchange securities.

As a writer

in the Nation points out: "During all the months before the October Panic, Wall Street's indications of coming trouble were
treated ••• as ••• Cassandra warnings; but the prudent
12

themselves or their money."

... hid

1Nall street and the Stock Ex-

change have always been the financial barometers of the state of
13

the nation's finances.

Nevertheless, the economy and high

spirits of the time left the general population with the false
idea that no more financial upsets would ever spoil the grand
economic situation which they were enjoying.

Yet, the solemn

10 Eugene Meyer Jr., "The New York Stock Exchange and the Panic
of 1~07," Yale Review, 18:36, May, 1909
11 Ibid., 38
12 "Wall Street Vindicated,ff Nation, 86:27, January 8, 1B08
13 Ibid.
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warnings had been sounded but

\~rent

As soon as the

unheeded.

storm broke, it se':omed that everyone turned to the stock

f1~xchange

and blar:led it unjustly for allowing suc 11 things to take place.
This was due in part to the past mistakes of the

:::i~xchange.

How-

ever, months after the Exchange succeeded in placing itself on a
firm basis after the upheaval, it 11IJas not slow in turning its
attention to give all possible aid to the liquidation of the industries and businesses of the entire country.

It was in this

way that many mistakenly misunderstood and believed that the
cause of suc h liquidation vms the Exchange instead of those for
wnom it was acting.

Thus, when smaller markets were not able to

meet their notes, business on the ?xchange iJractically reached
the panic state on that fatal

Oc~ober

24th day.

Meyer believes that one of the most imjJortant recommendations follOWing the ul.heaval should be the establishment
of a free market for liquid securities in Nei¥ York:
A country without a market in
which liquid securities can
be readily converted into cash,
is a country i:vithout any safe
economic barometer of the movement of capital and tne demands
for it, without the means of attracting and holding foreign

14 Chicago DailY Tribune, February 1,

1~07,

14
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capital and whic h can never aspire
to become the financial centerc.of
the '-'Torld. 15

Hence, it may be stated that the end of the Panic
YJas purely figurative.

To show what brought about its conclu-

sian is the best way to permit one to get and assimilate the '
Ddture, extent, and final phase of the tragic financial occurrence whi<'!h, had proper measure been taken, should never have
hapbJ ened •

15 Meyer, 46

CHAFTER VIII
CONCLUSION

From 1833 to 1906 there were many depressions
19hich almost rent asunder the financial fabric of t ne United
states.

Some of these were broug:nt about by panics.

Unfortu-

nately, many people were the unwij_~ing victims of financial
lep;erdemain.

Others who should have kndlwn better suffered ter-

rific losses through their O\m uncontrolled avarice.

Panics

invariably bring about deJ..,ressions even though depressions do
not always involve panics.

As '·',as stated previously, a depres-

sion is a prolonged Jeriod of business stagnation while a panic
is basically a stoppage on the rise of prices.
more endurable than the latter.

The former is

It is far easier to give a

description of tne effects of a panic or a dejJression than it is
to ferret out their fundamental causes.

Usually a situation develol is wherein the majority
are slo1}Jly lulled into a feeling of false security and blind
themselves to the visible signs
scene.

a~parent

in the shaky flimancial

They believe that their fTgood times" are the normal way

of life and thus are unshakeable.

68

Shaw, the Secretary of the
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Treasury, played an unenviable role in promoting such false security by means of

rQS

private deals with selected financial

tycoons from Wall street.

Financially our nation had just passed through the
second stage of financial growth which is akin to lusty a(101escence in nature.

The country was struggling mightily with all

the vim and vigor of a people too desireous to succeed, to be
recognized, and to blaze a brilliant trail ahead.

By

1~06,

de-

mands had been made for capital, materials, and workers to join
in the task of fulfilling the incessant clamor for new construction.

New construction necessitates expansion in all fields.

A

terrific set back was felt, however, on April 8, 1906 when tne
devastating and horrible earthquake and fire in San Francisco
literally shook the nation in more \flays than physically.
l.'vest coast was hardest hit.

'l'ne

Eastern insurance companies were

forced to draw on their reserves to bear Ui- ltnder the full affects of the shock.
Panic of 1907.
1906.

This disaster was not a direct cause of the

Prices actually arose (juring t he summer mont hs of

Dividends were high as a consequence, and the large finan-

cial institutions once more opened their doors to cayital from
t he smaller inland banks.

Despite the im;-,iortation of gold, the
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stock market began its decline durtng December.

With the davm

of the new year no es were high that conditions woulci son'e hOW
right themselves.

During February ana ic!larch, 1807, banking in-

stitutions found themselves in the embarrassing prenico..ment of
being forced to make loans on t he very loans which they had .pre. vii·usly arrange6.

The result of this financial sleig (Jt of hand

was the only too well knovm

If

Rich Men's Panic".

The public

fort'lUlately refused to nibble at this financial bait and as a
consequence, money became acutely short.

When Cr.arles

W.

Morse and his fripnds slJ.ddenly

lhTit hdrew from an active int!?rpst in their banks, rumors began to
fly.

At this time, t he New York Clearing llOuse Committee fou.nd

it necessary to rus h to the aid of the faltering Mercantile
Na'tional Bank on October 18.

United Copper's sudden flig!it from

the financial control of this bank almost brought the Mercantile
TJational Bank to t he point of financial suicirJ.e t l:le day previously.

Of course it was only natural for rUL10rs of a dire natl.lre

to slJread once the Clearing House Committee moved into the picture.

Charles T. Barney's resignation froEl the Knic]'\"erboc},er

Trust Company did not he.lp the situation one bit.· But when the
j{ational Bank of Commerce formally and steadfastly refused to

)

•
accept checks dra1J'TI1 on the distressed institution, many believed
their suspicions to be basically sound.

Following the eventful meeting on the ~?lst at
snerry 1 S Restaurant, the morning nens}.:apers cCirried the coml)lete
and dismal story in all its gory details.

Quite understandably,

early in the morning too ]:):)peful depositors lined up before tile
Knickerbocker Trust Company in order to withdravll their savings •
.As t bat fateful Tuesday, October E2, progressed suspicions Qid
not lag and the result was that almost all banks experienced
financial "runs" during the next few days.

It must be remem-

bereci t hat the trust companies 1 c !l2.rters lacked s~uecific provisions regulating currency, clemi:md de1·osits, cash reserves,
and strictures on investments.

TrlUs, trust companies and in-

surance groups pr;,~cticaL!_y had a free hand to do what they
pleased vvith t he money placed in their hands.

The task performed by the loan committee, composed of five bank presidents, was most commendable.

This commit-

tee, the Treasury Department, and business intere~ts helped
metterially in heel.ding off complete sta.2.;nation of general business.

These three groups agrepd that it was necessary to offer

'.'

:'\-:'
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premiums for currency.

Thro1lf;h this means, it was

noarded cash 'would be brought out of "lining.
t (at over two hun<ireu t inrty million

course stagnant.

hOl'8(j

that

It is estimated

LLars 1'Jas l".d.c,den and of

QO ..

In spite of the four

~\er

!:!ent premiums, t ne

money remained just w ,'1ere it was - hidden and unavailable •

The banks could see no clear way to expand tne
volume of money.

On!:!e these banks had become enrrJesrJed in the

tangle of their own f'inclllcial maneuverings their future became
(luite hopeless.

All acreed t ha.c

t!~e

remedy for tillS situation

v,ras a firm, sound, safe, and flexible currency.

In an attemr:t to uncover the !:!ause or causes of
the Panic of 1907, four main evils stand out prominently.

Cur-

rency, banks, over-speculation, and, to some, President Theodore Roosevelt are given eithpr as a main cause or a combination of causes.

It is a matter of opinion vThich of the above

mentioned played the stellar role but it is a fact t I'jat all
contributed.

(,;uite naturally, opinion was divided as to where

or to whom proper credit s110uld be given for savinf the financial debacle.

Some say "Big Business" deserves the credit.

Others maintain that the Secretary of the Treasury's actions

"
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mitigated the

dei.lressing effects of the Panic.

Still ot hers

stress the im.r:.1ortant role played by Clearing House certificates.
Tnese were temlJOrary loans made by associate banks, acting as a
Clearing House Association, to
Clearing House balances.

member~

for the settlement of tne

Suc h certificates were negotiated as

money and could be readily obtained.

Yet, their appearance made

it IJossible to iElj)Ort gold from Europe.

The interest on them

was high and in away t [Jis vms proved to be beneficial as the
reciplilent banks were only too anxious to pass t'l(;I!J on in orcier to
save money.

Not one single dollcJ.r, however, was lost tnrough

their use.

'l'owards the end of Decenber 1:;;07, tne Panic had
lJractically subsided.

The

SJ.OW

return of confidence proved to

be a slight stimulus for industry anci business.

Some, novv'ever,

misread t nis and believed that the wheels of lJrogress would gain
sufficient momentum of t hemsel ves.
taken.

l' hey were tragically mis-

After a sudden sUrge, the Stock Exchange experienceu. a

sudden decline.

In the late spring and early summer, commerce

and inaustry droj)ped dangerously low.

At this time the ciej,Jres-

sion ofH,08 slowly reared its ugly head and seemed determined
to feast on the misery creiited by the Panic a's long as possible.
Before the de,,9ress;ion, subsequent to the Panic, was able to
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fasten its debilitating tentaeles on the commercial ana financial life of our nation, t he Panic (1aCl haa a.Lmost immec.idte repercussions t nroughout the world.

Fortunately , Clowever , England

and France took immediate steps to forestall a financial disaster ¥,ritnin their· own slrpere and such efforts were successful.
These measures, so

o.L_~portunely

anri sagelY used abroad, were

studied later and incorporated into the American economic
system.

The derression following the Panic Vias final proof
t (jat something must be done to >revent future recurrences of
SUCD

financial distress.

As a result, the Aldrich-Vreeland Act

was passed hastily on May 30, 1908, seven [<Ionths after the OctoI

ber Panic.

As is usually the case with [lCLSty legislatiun,

bearing on an involved subject, it misfired, tnough its intentions were the best.

As Laughlin pointed out: tlItfihe Act) is

a curious coroi· ound of conflicting views, compromises, haste, and
2
j:Jolitics; but it is the law of tne land •••• t1

Both political parties \yere in mortal fear tLlat
trey would be sadej.].ed with the odium for the Panic and the

1 J. Laurence Laughlin, "The Aldrich-Vreeland Act, II Journal of
Political Economy, 16:490, October, 1908
2 Ibid., 498-499
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subsequent depression.
were determined t nat t

The Republicans, being the party in power
(lB

blame vlOulcL not be laid at their Qoor;

the Democrat s, on the other band, were equally as cietermined to
stress their part in working out t ne present and future economic
stability.

The issue, however, was too large, too pertinent,

and entirely too complicated for the legislators, whether Eepublican or Democrat.

Nevertheless, aLL agreed that somet.hing

had to be done and that quickly in order to satisfy the rising
clamor of public unrest and disgust.

As a result of this de-

termination to "do something" quickly, the patchwork AldrichVreeland Bill was voted upon before printed cOljies had been issued to the legislators.
lacked the slig:htest

Naturally, too many of t

con~eption

•

legislators

of w(Jat thfj pm'ported Bill was

supposed to "dOll or wnat it actually meant.
tDis situation as

ne

Laughlin summarizes

fol~ows:

••• we h&ve in -this Ald~ich
Vreeland Act - the product of
a few days struggle at the end
of the session - an unexpected
freedom of issues based on
banking assets, as well as a
Pandora's box full of unknown
possibilities for evil. It is
an amazing lesson on the folly
of politics in banking. 3

Although Laughlin's criticism is not overly exaggeratecl it does

3 Laughlin, 513
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neglect the two iF1i)ortant achievements of the Act.

The national

ba.nks were now given the privilege of issuing emergency currency
in times of financial disturbance and the National Monetary Commission was created.

The latter's }iurpose was nto secure an

01'-

ganization of capital and crer:lit maintained under all circum4

stances and conditions •••• n

After an investipation of four years of vmrld

CUI'-

rency systems, plans were drafted for t ne United States' banking
and currency reforms.

The year following the Commission's re-

port, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was adopted.

Ever since

t hat year it has been the weLL rounded, stablizing force protecting American investors and the nation's economy.

This fa-

mous Act created a series of sectional banks governed by a Fed5

eral Heserve Board (whic h consisted of seven mernbers).

A

Federal Heserve Bank was to be established in twelve districts
of the country.

Every national bank bad to del)Osit its reserve
6

in t nis new type' bank.

T he Act fUrther L,rovided for the

creation of Fed€ral Reserve notes to aid in giving more

4 Aldrich, Monetary Commission, 3
5 Two of t he members were t he Secret ary of the 'rreasury and the
Comptroller of the Currency; while, t 11e ot her five were to be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a
ten year term. From the latter group snould corne the governor
of the entire board
6 State banks had the privilege of using these city hanks' cash
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elasticity to the currency.

Thus we have seen t flat it was almost necessary
for t he nation to suffer from a series of succeeding panics anti
(leiJressions before our le.2;islators were forced by the logic of
cold, hard financial fa.cts to fas (don an instrurnent wnich would
give protection to all.

The need and dire necessity of such

a

legislative instrument was brought into bold relief by the Panic
of 1907.

Though the suffering, consequent to the Panic and de-

pression, .vas nard to bear, the fruit is brought fort 11 in the
form of the Federal Heserve Act was wort J~y of all the suffering.

7 John D. Hicks, A Short Histor;y: of American Democracy, Houghton
Mifflin Co., New York, 1943, 640
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"After the Panic, II 85:527, December 5, 1907
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"Two Causes of the Financial Collapse," 85:597-598, December 26,
1907
!!Wal1 Street Vindicated," 86:27-28, January 9, 1908
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93:1-5, January, 1908, presents the English

Panic.
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Stokes Co., New York, 1911, contains the best material on depressions of this period.
Juglar, Clement, A Brief History- of Panics and Their
Periodical Occurrences in the United State~, G.P. Putnam's Sons,
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s Sons, New York, 190'7, concprns mostly t.he description
of American industrial moveDents and activities for German
students.
:~)cribner'

Laughlin, J. Laurence, The Prinei: )les of Money, Charles
Scribner t s Sons, I\Jew York, 190o, iJresents basic material essential to understanding of ~oney.
Marburg, Theodore, The Panic and the Present Depression, Philadelphia, April 10, 1;;)08, acts as 8, ODe man pressure
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T he Currency Problem and the Present Financial Situai:j.on, Columbia University Press, I~ew York, 1808, contains an excellent series of lectures on all money operations of the 180'7
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BEVbRAGES IN T.HE UNITED S'IIATES

Year
'-

Wines
(t!,Hllons)
",.,

j,lalt
Liquors
(gallons)

Spirits
(proof
gallons)

'J.1otal Gallons

1840

.?9

1.36

~:.52

4.17

1850
.

,27

1.58

2.23

4.08

1860

.35

~;;.

22

;:-:.86

6.43

1870

.32

5.31

;~.

07

7.70

1880

.56

8.26

1.27

10.08

1890

.46

1:3.67

1.40

15. 5~'5

1900

.39

16.02

1.28

17.69

1908

.60

20.97

1.44

23.01

.

-

*

Ernest L .• Bogart and Charles N. Thompson, Readj.nvs. in the
Economic History of the United St8~es, Longmans, Green and Co.,
New York, 1~25, 835
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SA1V1PLE ADD

~~

puy and sell hills of
LEI'TERS

exc mnge ami make ca-

of

ble transfers of money
on all foreign ;Joints;

CREDIT

also make collections,
and issue CornmerQial
and Travellers' Credits
available in all parts
of the

\i7

orl<1.

International Cheques.Certif1cates of
Deposit.
]3rQi;'ffi Brothers and Co.
No. 59 Wall Street, Ne1i\T York

*

Nation, 85:455, November 14, 1907
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RPPENDIX D
SAMPLES OF EMERGENCY MONEY

*

*

Quarterly Journal of Economics, 22:516-518, August, 1908

A mony Ihe / ollowing sam ples 0/ emcrgenc!J currcnc!! S os. 1__ rcprcoenl c/Paring-h oll se
certi{u;ales; Nos'. 9- 10, clearing-holl c checks; N os. il - 15, cashiers' checks TJlJyable 10
bearer ; N o. 16 , reserve agent e.l'c!wngc; N os. I i - I . , dep()sit cel'li!icalcs; anrl S os. 19- 24,
mcm u /aclurers' pa.y scrip. F or i', o . 6, 8 , 15, _ I , fU , 2.;, and 24 I a III inde/Jleti I() Ihe
collection 0/ lIfr. Theodore H . Price, 0/ ew Y oTk.
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'APPENDIX E
CLEARINU HOUSE CEFTIFICATE ISSUANCE

*

The date of the first issue was. October 26,1907
The date of the first cancellation 1Nas November 14,
The date of

tr~

1~)07

final issue was January 30, 1908

The date of the final cancellation was Marc.h 28, 1908
The gross issue was $101,060,000
The maximum amount outstanciing was $88,420,000, December 16, 18Q7

*

Sprague, 428
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APPENDIX F
STOCK EXCdANGE CHANGES PREVIOUS TO OCTOBER 1907

Year

*

Transactions
in shares,
Millions

- -

Increase
or
decrease

Total
value,
Millions
of dollars

Increase
or
decrease

~~

%

--

-

'1903

.., 161

1904

187

6.1

12,061

9.1

1905

263

40.2

21,295

76.8

1906

284

8.0

1907

196

-31.0

Meyer, 36
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11,000

393

8.9

14,757

-36.8

~23,
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